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Abstract
Based on Brandtler (2012), this paper argues that polarity items are sensitive to evaluability,
a concept that refers to the possibility of accepting or rejecting an utterance as true in a com-
municative exchange. The main distinction is made between evaluable and non-evaluable ut-
terances. The evaluable category comprises any clause that asserts, presupposes or entails the
truth of an affirmative or a negative proposition. In contrast, the non-evaluable category con-
tains clauses that do not assert, presuppose or entail the truth of an affirmative or a negative
proposition.
According to the Evaluability Hypothesis, non-evaluable environments are natural hosts for
both NPIs and PPIs. Hence, the occurrence of polarity items in non-evaluable clauses does not
require formal licensing, and this is the reason we find both PPIs and weak NPIs in yes/no-
questions and conditionals. Evaluable clauses, in contrast, are restricted environments and may
only host polarity items that are formally (i.e. syntactically) licensed. Hence, NPIs require the
presence of a licensing element, and PPIs require the absence of such elements. This analysis
leads to an important change of perspective, as the occurrence of polarity items in negative and
affirmative sentences becomes the marked, or exceptional, case.
1 Introduction
Often overlooked in discussions on polarity phenomena is the fact that ‘non-negative’
contexts, such as yes/no-questions and conditionals, tend to host both positive and
(weak) negative polarity items in identical syntactic settings. Consider the distribution
of the NPI ever and the PPI still in (1) and (2) below.
(1) a. Have you ever been to Paris?
b. Have you still that item for sale?
The current work has been funded by a grant from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Sweden. The ideas pre-
sented in this paper have been developed over a number of years, and culminated in the publication of Brandtler
(2012). I am grateful to numerous people for discussions, and would especially like to thank Elisabeth Eng-
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(2) a. If you ever go to Paris, you must see the Eiffel Tower.
b. If you still have that item for sale, I’m interested in buying it.
The pattern illustrated above is distinct from the well-known complementary distri-
bution of PPIs and NPIs in declaratives, as shown in (3):
(3) a. I have never ever / *still been to Paris.
b. I still / *ever have that item for sale.
Since the pioneering work of Jespersen (1917), almost every proposed theoretical
explanation of the distribution of polarity items has taken the occurrence of polarity
items in negative contexts as primary, while regarding the licensing properties of the
non-negative contexts in (1) and (2) as exceptional. It has been a prevalent idea that NPIs
depend on some kind of formal licensing requirement in order to occur within a clause,
such as being in the syntactic and/or semantic scope of a licensor of relevant properties
(negation, universal quantifiers, superlatives, the restriction of only etc.); see e.g. Ladu-
saw (1979, 1980), Linebarger (1980, 1987), Progovac (1994), Giannakidou (1998 and
onwards), and Horn (2002) for different proposals along this line. As yes/no-questions
and conditionals may host polarity items even in the absence of an overt licensor, the
search has been directed at finding an underlying syntactic/semantic licensing feature
common to both negative and non-negative licensing contexts.
This paper changes perspective, and argues that the occurrence of polarity items in
yes/no-questions and conditionals is actually the unmarked case. Based on Brandtler
(2012), it is proposed that polarity items are sensitive to evaluability, a concept that
refers to the possibility of accepting or rejecting an utterance as true in a communica-
tive exchange. Utterances (or parts of utterances) are either evaluable or non-evaluable.
According to the Evaluability Hypothesis, non-evaluable utterances are natural hosts for
polarity items. Hence, the occurrence of polarity items in these environments does not
require any kind of formal licensing, and this is the reason we find both PPIs and NPIs
in the yes/no-questions and conditionals in (1) and (2) above. Evaluable utterances, in
contrast, are restricted environments and may only host polarity items that are formally
licensed. Hence, NPIs require the presence of a licensing element, as in (3a), and PPIs
require the absence of such elements, as in (3b). According to the Evaluability Hypoth-
esis, then, formal licensing is regarded as a means of ‘rescuing’ the polarity item from
an otherwise hostile environment. If this characterization is correct, polarity items can
be defined as semantically sensitive expressions that sometimes must rely on a formal
dependency relation in order to fulfill their semantic requirement.
It is further argued that the notion of evaluability has structural correlates in Swedish,
the language on which the discussion is primarily based: evaluable clauses have [Spec,CP],
while non-evaluable clauses lack [Spec,CP]. This connection is argued to exist because
of an arbitrary (but fixed) association between the edge-feature in C (see Chomsky 2008)
and evaluability.
The concept of evaluability is distinct from the semantic notion of veridicality (see
Giannakidou 1998), and it is argued that the current proposal renders better empirical
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results than theories building on veridicality – at least in relation to the Mainland Scan-
dinavian languages (Swedish, Danish and Norwegian) and English.1 Furthermore, the
present theory incorporates the notion of downward entailment (Ladusaw 1979, 1980)
in a natural manner, although its applicability is restricted to evaluable environments.
As a consequence, the main insight of the DE-approach is maintained under the present
hypothesis.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, I present a brief
overview of previous theories, and the problems associated with accounting for the
non-complementary distribution of NPIs and PPIs in yes/no-questions and conditionals.
Section 3 gives the empirical background of this study, showing that the licensing of
polarity items in Swedish correlates in a striking manner with the configuration of the C-
domain. In section 4 the notion of evaluability is defined and related to Swedish clause
structure, and in section 5 evaluability is related to polarity sensitivity. The connection
between evaluability, polarity sensitivity and the Swedish C-domain is explicated in
section 6.
2 The Problem
Although the distribution of polarity items is both empirically complex and theoretically
evasive, one may roughly distinguish three different NPI-licensing patterns:
(4) 1. Licensing by an overt clausemate licensor:
I have never ever been to Paris.
2. Licensing by an overt superordinate licensor:
I regret that I ever talked to him.
3. Licensing in the absence of an overt licensor:
Have you ever been to Paris?
Within syntactically oriented approaches to polarity item licensing, the idea of polar-
ity items as dependent expressions has been prevalent ever since Klima (1964): polarity
items must be within the syntactic scope of an operator with relevant licensing proper-
ties. The obvious problem for any syntactic approach is how to account for the licensing
pattern 3 above, i.e. licensing in the absence of an overt licensor. The solution, as put
forward in e.g. Progovac (1994), is to assume a covert anteceding operator that binds
the polarity item in its governing domain. Under this view, the feature bundle respon-
sible for licensing may be either overt or covert, much like the overt/covert realization
of case, number, or gender etc. in the world’s languages.
The syntactic operator approach fails to account for the non-complementary distri-
bution of PPIs and NPIs, however. That is, if a covert licensing operator is responsible
for the licit occurrence of ever in (1a), then the very same operator should, in principle,
1Even though the Evaluability Hypothesis should in principle be extendable to the other Germanic lan-
guages, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss cross-Germanic variation of polarity item licensing in
any detail.
3
rule out the occurrence of the PPI still in (1b) – contrary to fact.2 What is more, with-
out providing a proper definition of the assumed operator, any purely syntactic account
becomes close to non-explanatory, even if it were to attain descriptive adequacy.
Within semantically based approaches to polarity sensitivity, the most influential is
that of Ladusaw (1979, 1980), according to which polarity sensitivity can be understood
in terms of logical inferencing from sets to subsets, from the general to the specific.
The prediction is that NPIs are licensed in any environment or by any operator that is
downward entailing (DE). The denotation of a DE-expression is a monotone decreasing
function, i.e. an order reversing function that allows inferences from sets to subsets. An
appealing feature of Ladusaw’s proposal is that the complementary distribution of NPIs
and PPIs fall out naturally: NPIs are licensed in downward entailing environments,
whereas PPIs are licensed in upward entailing environments.
Similar to syntactic operator approaches, however, the DE-hypothesis cannot ac-
count for the licensing pattern 3 above, albeit for entirely different reasons. Since
yes/no-questions and conditionals are non-monotone – i.e. they neither allow entail-
ments from the specific to the general (upward) nor from the general to the specific
(downward) – their ability to host polarity items cannot be explained under Ladusaw’s
theory.3
In part conceived as a reaction to Ladusaw’s hypothesis, Giannakidou’s (1998 and
onwards) Veridicality Hypothesis offers an alternative account of polarity sensitivity
that does account for NPI licensing in yes/no-questions and conditionals. According to
the Veridicality Hypothesis, weak negative polarity items, such as ever, any are licensed
by nonveridicality, that is, by undetermined truth-values. Strong NPIs, in contrast, have
a more limited distribution and are licensed by anti-veridicality, i.e. by clauses or op-
erators entailing the falsity of p.4 One major advantage of Giannakidou’s theory is that
polarity items are defined as semantically sensitive expressions, and need not rely on
2Progovac (1994) does address the problem of PPIs in ‘non-negative licensing contexts’ in some detail.
Assuming that the covert operator is located in C, Progovac argues that NPIs must raise to C at LF, while PPIs
remain low and hence is outside the scope of the operator. While we need not go into details here, there are a
number of both conceptual and empirical problems with such an analysis; the reader is referred to Horn and
Lee (1995) and Brandtler (2012: section 7.2) for a critical discussion.
3The non-monotone status of yes/no-questions and optatives should be self-evident: they have no truth-
value and are consequently not open to truth-based inferencing. With respect to conditionals, the story is
somewhat more complex. The DE-status of the antecedent of conditionals is not obvious, as the following
example show (taken from von Fintel 1999: 136):
i. If John subscribes to newspaper, he must be well informed÷
If John subscribes to a newspaper that he can’t read, he must be well informed.
Discussing a number of similar examples, von Fintel (1999: 135 ff.) notes that “in the modern semantic
and philosophical literature on conditionals, it is now taken for granted that conditionals are not monotonic in
their antecedent”.
4A propositional operator F is veridical if and only if from the truth of Fp one can infer that p is true.
Otherwise, it is nonveridical. Anti-veridical operators entail the falsity of p. Note that anti-veridical operators
form a subset of the nonveridical operators, since the logic inference Fpñ p is not valid for them either.
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any form of syntactic scope/licensing in order to be licit within a clause; it also explains
the occurrence of NPIs in nonveridical contexts in a non-stipulative manner.
But there are some severe problems associated with the Veridicality Hypothesis as
well. First, similar to the syntactic account of Progovac, it does not account for the non-
complementary distribution of PPIs and NPIs in conditionals and yes/no-questions. In
fact, Giannakidou explicitly refrains from discussing the distribution of PPIs (1998: 19),
thus making the predictions of the Veridicality Hypothesis restricted to NPIs. Second,
her theory cannot without further stipulation account for the NPI-licensing pattern 2
above, i.e. long-distance licensing by emotive factive predicates like regret. Since
complements to factive predicates are veridical, the occurrence of embedded NPIs is
predicted to be impossible, contrary to fact.5
Although distinctly different, the theories of Progovac, Ladusaw and Giannakidou
have at least two things in common: i) they build on the seemingly uncontroversial
assumption that polarity items are dependent expressions, and ii) they have problems
accounting for the non-complementary distribution of NPIs and PPIs. In what follows,
I will argue that the problem ii) stems from the assumption i). According to the present
proposal, polarity items are defined as semantically sensitive expressions that must rely
on a formal dependency relation in certain environments only, namely in evaluable
utterances. But before developing this idea further, let us first review the relevant em-
pirical data, taken from Swedish.
3 Polarity Sensitivity in Swedish
In this section, I give a brief empirical presentation of the distribution of polarity items in
Swedish. It is shown that Swedish displays a striking correlation between the structural
configuration of the C-domain and the different ways polarity items may be licensed.
As the Germanic languages in general (disregarding English), Swedish is a V2-
language, meaning that the finite verb in declarative main clauses must be preceded by
one clausal constituent only. Following standard theory, Swedish main clauses display
generalized V-to-C movement: the finite verb must raise from its base position in V to
C0. While V-to-C movement is found in all Swedish main clauses (with the exception of
wh-exclamatives), [Spec,CP] need not be phonologically realized in all sentence types.
Yes/no-questions, imperatives and optatives are linearly V1, meaning that the finite verb
is not preceded by a clausal element, as shown in (6) below. The standard V2 word order
is exemplified by the declarative in (5a), and its assumed structure illustrated in (5b):
(5) a. Antagligen
Probably
gillar
likes
Sven
Sven
inte
not
hamburgare.
hamburgers
‘Sven probably doesn’t like hamburgers.’
5The Veridicality Hypothesis apparently makes the correct predictions for Greek, in which NPIs in factive
complements are ungrammatical. Giannakidou (2006) suggests a solution to the grammatical English cases,
which builds on additional contextual factors.
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b. [Spec,CP Antagligen [C0 gillarj [Spec,TP Sveni [NegP inte [VP ti tj hamburgare]]]]]
(6) a. Gillar
likes
Sven
Sven
inte
not
hamburgare?
hamburgers
‘Doesn’t Sven like hamburgers?’
b. [Spec,CP Ø [C0 gillarj [Spec,TP Sveni [NegP inte [VP ti tj hamburgare]]]]]
Subordinate clauses, in contrast, do not generally display V-to-C movement in Swe-
dish. The complementizer is standardly assumed to reside in C0, effectively blocking
the raising of the finite verb (see Platzack 1986). There are some systematic exceptions
to this pattern, however, as complements to assertive and semi-factive predicates are
well-known to allow so called embedded V2 (see e.g. Andersson 1975). Compare the
standard (non-V2) subordinate clause in (7) with the embedded V2-clause in (8). Note
that the raising of the finite verb affects the relative ordering between the verb and any
clause adverbial.
(7) a. att
that
Sven
Sven
inte
not
gillar
likes
hamburgare.
hamburgers
‘…that Sven doesn’t like hamburgers.’
b. [Spec,CP Ø [C0 att [Spec,TP Sveni [NegP inte [VP ti gillar hamburgare ]]]]]
(8) a. att
that
Sven
Sven
gillar
likes
inte
not
hamburgare.
hamburgers
b. [Spec,CP att [Spec,CP Sveni [C gillarj [Spec,TP ti [NegP inte [VP ti tj hambur-
gare]]]]]]
Relating Swedish clause structure to polarity item licensing, I show in Brandtler
(2012) that any Swedish clause overtly realizing [Spec,CP] displays licensing pattern
1: NPIs must be licensed by an overt clausemate licensor. This pattern is thus character-
istic of declaratives (9a), wh-questions (9b), embedded V2-clauses (9c), non-restrictive
relative clauses (9d), as well as wh-exclamatives:6
(9) a. Jag
I
vill
want
*(aldrig)
never
någonsin
ever
åka
go
tillbaka.
back
‘I never want to go back.’
b. Vilken
which
känd
famous
artist
artist
turnerade
toured
*(aldrig)
never
någonsin
ever
utanför
outside
USA?
USA
‘Which well-known artist never ever toured outside the U.S.?
6Two things are worth emphasizing here. First, wh-questions do allow NPIs even in the absence of an
overt licensor, in which case they often have a rhetorical flavor. In Brandtler (2012: chapt. 10), I argue
that NPI-licensing in such cases is dependent on the denotation of the wh-word: only when the denotation
of the wh-word is a downward entailing function does it license polarity items. Second, wh-exclamatives do
not allow polarity items at all. This behavior is curious in itself, but can perhaps be explained by the fact
that exclamatives cannot be negated either. Hence, my claim that NPIs need to be formally licensed in wh-
exclamatives might still hold, even though this requirement, for independent reasons, cannot be satisfied. See
Zanuttini and Portner (2003) for a discussion on exclamatives, and Brandtler (2012: sections 4.2.2 and 6.1.4)
for a discussion on the syntax and polarity sensitivity of Swedish wh-exclamatives.
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c. Han
he
sa,
said
att
that
han
he
ville
wanted
*(aldrig)
never
någonsin
ever
åka
go
tillbaka.
back
‘He said that he never ever wanted to go back.’
d. Sven,
Sven
som
who
för
for
övrigt
other
*(aldrig)
never
någonsin
ever
lämnat
left
Sverige,
Sweden
ska
shall
flytta
move
till
to
Kongo.
Congo
‘Sven, who by the way never ever has left Sweden, is moving to Congo.’
Swedish linear V1-clauses (lacking overt realization of [Spec,CP]), on the other
hand, display licensing pattern 3, i.e. they allow NPIs even in the absence of an overt
licensor. This pattern thus holds for yes/no-questions, optatives and (the antecedent of)
conditionals, similar to the English examples in (1) and (2) above.
With regards to subordinate clauses, the story is somewhat more complex. In clauses
introduced by the complementizer att ‘that’, NPIs are generally not grammatical unless
licensed either by an overt clausemate or a superordinate licensor (licensing pattern 2).
Clauses introduced by om ‘if’, however, readily allow NPIs even in the absence of an
overt clausemate or superordinate licensor, and thus pattern with V1-clauses in adhering
to pattern 3.7 This licensing difference can be mapped to structural configurations as
well.
Standard, non-V2 att-clauses in Swedish allow optional insertion of a cataphoric
propositional pronoun det ‘it’ in between the finite verb and the complementizer. This
possibility is indicative of [Spec,CP] in the subordinate clause, as illustrated in (10)
below:
(10) a. Jag
I
beklagar
regret
(det)
it
att
that
jag
I
sårade
hurt
dig.
you
‘I’m sorry for that I hurt you.’
b. Jag
I
sa
said
(det)
it
att
that
han
he
förmodligen
probably
skulle
would
förlora.
lose
‘I told him he would probably lose.’
It appears that the possibility of det-insertion is available in most assertive and fac-
tive predicate constructions in Swedish. A similar observation has been made for En-
glish, where complements to factive predicates may be introduced by the fact, which led
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) to assume a fact operator in [Spec,CP] in these clauses. In
contrast, Swedish om-clauses does not allow cataphoric det-insertion, as the sentences
in (11) show:
(11) a. Jag
I
beklagar
regret
(*det)
it
om
if
jag
I
sårade
hurt
dig.
you
7One may of course argue that the complementizer if is a lexical instantiation of a licensing operator. As
already mentioned above, the fact that both NPIs and PPIs may occur in conditionals is highly problematic for
such an analysis, as PPIs then must be allowed in spite of this very operator. An extensive critical discussion
of the operator-approach is found in Brandtler (2012: 7.2.2).
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‘I’m sorry if I hurt you.’
b. Jag
I
undrar
wonder
(*det)
that
om
if
han
he
kommer
comes
till
to
festen.
party.def
‘I wonder if he comes to the party.’
If the possibility of det-insertion is dependent on [Spec,CP], it seems reasonable to as-
sume that [Spec,CP] is not available in om-clauses. Hence, att- and om-clauses are
structurally different with regards to the syntactic configuration of the C-domain: om-
clauses cannot instantiate [Spec,CP], similar to (linear) V1-clauses. The structural sim-
ilarity between V1-clauses and om-clauses is further strengthened by the fact that both
may function as the antecedent of a conditional, as illustrated in (12) below:
(12) a. Om
if
du
you
ser
see
Maria,
Maria
hälsa
greet
henne
her
från
from
mig.
me
‘If you see Maria, say hello from me.’
b. Ser
see
du
you
Maria,
Maria
hälsa
greet
henne
her
från
from
mig.
me
Summarizing this discussion on Swedish, I have argued that att-clauses are struc-
turally similar to V2 clauses in having a phonologically realizable [Spec,CP], while
om-clauses are structurally similar to V1 clauses in lacking [Spec,CP]. Clauses with
[Spec,CP] differ only with regards to whether the phonological instantiation of [Spec,CP]
is obligatory or not. All in all, we may thus distinguish three configurations of the
Swedish C-domain, based on the realization of [Spec,CP]. And intriguingly, these struc-
tural configurations can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion with the three distinct licens-
ing patterns in (4) above. Consider (13):
(13) 1. Licensing by an overt clausemate licensor:
[Spec,CP] obligatorily realized
2. Licensing by an overt superordinate licensor:
[Spec,CP] optionally realizable
3. Licensing in the absence of an overt licensor:
[Spec,CP] non-realizable
Naturally, one must be careful when interpreting this correlation. It seems highly un-
likely that the structural configuration per se affects the polarity sensitivity of the clause,
as yes/no-questions, to mention one example, are well known cross-linguistically to host
‘unlicensed’ NPIs, irrespective of their syntactic structure.
But the structural fact in Swedish that ‘unlicensed’ NPIs are licit in all clauses lack-
ing [Spec,CP], but banned from all clauses with [Spec,CP] certainly calls for an ex-
planation. The crucial question we need to focus on here is why: why does there exist
a correlation between the structural configuration of the clause and its NPI-licensing
properties?
I propose that we should focus not so much on the structural configurations them-
selves, as on the very fact that there are structural differences between clauses with
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different licensing properties to begin with. If the syntactic classification mirrors a se-
mantic distinction, we can assume that this semantic distinction has a bearing on polar-
ity phenomena as well. In the next section, I argue that the relevant semantic property
relevant for both polarity item licensing and the configuration of the C-domain is evalu-
ability.
4 Evaluability
Previous work on polarity phenomena has repeatedly explored the relation between
negation and truth, and its relevance for polarity item licensing. The downward en-
tailing approach of Ladusaw (1980) builds on the preserving/reversing of truth-value
based inferences; the Veridicality Hypothesis as proposed by Giannakidou (1998) on
the (non)availability of truth entailments. Even Progovac (1994) suggests that her po-
larity operator is somehow licensed by “unfixed truth-values”.
The notion of truth in formal logic builds on Frege’s classic conception of meaning:
to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which it is true. The
judgment of a sentence as true or false thus hinges on the satisfaction of these truth-
conditions. A slightly different picture of the relation between truth and falsity emerges
if we change from the logico-semantic perspective to a pragmatic (or communicative)
perspective.
Intuitively, what is at stake in conversation is not so much the logical or actual truth
of a given statement as the acceptance of that statement as true. This distinction is
important. According to Stalnaker (2002), accepting a proposition equals treating it as
true, even in cases where one might suspect that it is actually not true. Observe the
following passage from Stalnaker (2002: 716) (italics in original):
To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least
temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false. Belief
is the most basic acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition as
true is that one believes that it is true. But there may be various reasons to ignore
the possible situations in which some proposition is false even when one realizes
that one of those possible situations may be the actual one. One may simplify or
idealize in an inquiry, one may presume innocence to ensure fairness, one may make
assumptions for the purpose of contingency planning, one may grant something for
the purpose of an argument.
As Stalnaker points out above, it is perfectly possible to accept (i.e. to treat as true)
a proposition that is demonstrably false in the actual world. This means that although
the acceptance of a proposition is not entirely unrelated to the fulfillment of logical
truth-conditions, it nevertheless builds on an additional set of contextual, social, and/or
communicative considerations.
At the core of discourse acceptance lies the notion of evaluability. That is, in order
to accept or deny a proposition presented to us, we must evaluate the likelihood for it
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being true according to our beliefs, knowledge, inclination towards the speaker etc. In
fact, we constantly evaluate all state-of-affairs presented to us – be it by observation,
discovery, conversation or other kinds of perception. In reading this, you have probably
already begun to evaluate whether my claim is correct or not. Consider the following
passage from Lyons (1977: 777):
As one rejects some physical entity that is offered (pushing it away so that it disap-
pears or goes away (. . . )), so one may reject a proposition or a proposal. Looked at
from this point of view (. . . ) assent and dissent, rather than truth and falsity, would
seem to be the notions with which we should operate in any account that we give
of the difference between the assertion and the denial of p.
If we follow Lyons’ line of reasoning, the opposition between affirmative and neg-
ative propositions is directly related to our communicative need to evaluate and ac-
cept/reject information presented to us. Within a communicative exchange, however,
one can only evaluate utterances used by the speaker to assert, presuppose, or entail the
truth of p or p. Let us call such sentences evaluable.
Importantly, both affirmative and negative utterances are equally evaluable. This
claim rests on the Aristotelian view of negation as a mode of predication, and is at odds
with the “standard” view within modal logic of negation as a truth-functional connec-
tive. That is, instead of structurally treating p as “it is not the case that p”, p can
be treated as “it is the case that not-p”. Under this view, a negative utterance does not
assert the falsity of p but rather asserts (the truth of) not-p; cf. the discussion in Lyons
(1977: 768) and Allen (2006: 5). This is why it is just as easy for the addressee to
accept a negative utterance as true or false, as it is to accept an affirmative utterance.8
Contrasting with evaluable utterances, we find utterances by which the speaker does
not assert, presuppose, or entail the truth of p or p. Such utterances (or part of utter-
ances) cannot be evaluated, as the addressee cannot assent or dissent with a sentence
or a clause to which the speaker is not truthfully committed. We call such clauses non-
evaluable. For example, it is not possible to accept or reject the propositional content of
a yes/no-question, since by uttering such a question the speaker does not take responsi-
bility for the truth of neither p nor p.
In short, my notion of evaluability refers to the possibility of accepting or rejecting
an utterance (or part of an utterance) as true. Note the focus on possibility here; the
actual acceptance or rejection is of no relevance. Neither is the logical possibility of es-
tablishing the truth of a given utterance in relation to possible worlds or epistemic mod-
els. Hence, the concerns of modal logic are independent from the notion of evaluability.
This is important, since it allows us to move away from truth-conditional inferencing.
The question of whether an utterance is true or false does not arise, only the question of
whether it is possible to accept that utterance as true in discourse.
8Horn (1989 [2001]: chapt. 7) argues explicitly against the view of natural language negation as being an
external truth-functional connective, based on the observation that “syntactically external (clause-peripheral)
negation, as an iterating one-place connective on propositions, never – or hardly ever – happens [in the world’s
languages]”, Horn (1989 [2001]: 471).
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The actual evaluation process can take slightly different forms, however. One may
distinguish between (at least) two kinds of evaluable utterances: i) those that are sub-
jected to evaluation in the current (on-going) communicative exchange, and ii) those
that are not subjected to evaluation in the on-going communicative exchange. I be-
lieve this distinction may capture the difference between, for instance, assertions and
presuppositions in an intuitive and straightforward manner.
Both assertions and presuppositions are evaluable notions, as they are used by the
speaker to affirm the truth of p or p. On the view famously defended by Stalnaker
(1978: 153), the essential effect of an assertion “is to change the presuppositions of
the participants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is
presupposed.” If the assertion is accepted by the hearer/s, the speaker has succeeded in
adding new information to the conversational common ground. In this way, a (success-
ful) assertion reduces the set of possible worlds so that “all of the possible situations
incompatible with what is said is eliminated” (ibid).
According to the Stalnakerian view, the relation between assertion and presuppo-
sition can be summarized in the following way: a (successful) assertion becomes part
of the conversational common ground (i.e. the presuppositions shared by speaker and
hearer), therefore a presupposition is basically nothing but a ‘previously accepted asser-
tion’. Naturally, this claim should not be taken too literally. A presupposed proposition
need not have originated as an actual assertion in a given discourse, but it is crucially
treated as though it had.
In terms of evaluability, assertions and presuppositions can be said to differ only
with regards to when and how the evaluative process takes place, as it were. Asserted
information may be accepted or challenged by the hearer, and is as such subjected to
evaluation in the on-going discourse. In contrast, presupposed information is treated as
uncontroversial or already accepted information, and is as such not subjected to evalu-
ation in the on-going discourse. But crucially, this does not mean that a presupposition
is non-evaluable. It does affirm the truth of p or p. The basic difference between the
two notions is simply that an assertion is subjected to evaluation at the time of utterance,
whereas a presupposition has been subjected to evaluation at a time prior to the time of
utterance, or at least functions as though it has been. This follows naturally from the
Stalnakerian view that the presuppositions of the conversational common ground are
but previously accepted assertions.
Let us now illustrate the ‘evaluability classification’, in which the evaluable cate-
gory has been divided into two subcategories in order to capture inter alia the difference
between assertions and presuppositions:
(14) Utterances
Evaluable
Subjected Not subjected
Non-evaluable
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The Evaluability Classification
Importantly, the two evaluable subcategories do not equal assertion and presuppo-
sition, respectively. In the “subjected to”-class, we find not only main clause declara-
tives, but also sentence types which are not generally used to make assertions, such as
wh-exclamatives, wh-questions and non-restrictive relative clauses. Although distinctly
different, these sentence types are all possible for the hearer to evaluate (i.e. accept or
reject) in the on-going communicative exchange.9
The “not subjected to”-category contains that-clauses functioning as complements
to factive and non-assertive predicates, as well as restrictive relative clauses and Swedish
att-exclamatives.10 Hence, these sentence types express propositions that are either pre-
supposed or backgrounded, in the pragmatic sense of being neither asserted nor presup-
posed.
The non-evaluable category, finally, contains sentence types which do not express
any commitment on part of speaker as to the truth of p or p, such as (the antecedent
of) conditionals, yes/no-questions and optatives. For further discussion and motivation
of the evaluability classification, the reader is referred to Brandtler (2012: ch. 6).
As the attentive reader no doubt has already concluded, the evaluability classifica-
tion can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion with the three structural configurations in
Swedish as distinguished in the previous section. Consider figure (15):
9A wh-exclamative may be challenged by the hearer, as a reply like I certainly have not! is felicitous
in relation to the utterance What big feet you have!. Non-restrictive relative clauses display a number of
syntactic and semantic properties associated with main clause declaratives (see Hooper and Thompson (1973)),
including the possibility of being challenged by the hearer. According to the evaluability classification, the
controversial issues surrounding the question of whether subordinate clauses can be asserted is avoided, which
in itself is a theoretical argument for assuming the present categorization. Wh-questions, finally, implicate
open propositions that are cancelled when answered negatively: the answer Nobody effectively cancels the
implication of the question Who was late for work? that somebody was late for work.
10Having no exact counterpart in English, Swedish att-exclamatives (‘that’-) have the form of subordinate
att-complements, while functioning as main clause exclamatives:
(1) Att
that
du
you
aldrig
never
kan
can
komma
be
i
in
tid!
time
‘I’m amazed/surprised that you’re never on time!’
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(15) Sentences
Evaluable
Subjected
Overt [Spec,CP]
Not subjected
Covert [Spec,CP]
Non-evaluable
No [Spec,CP]
The Evaluability Classification and Swedish Clause Structure
Again, when analysing this correlation between clause structure and evaluability,
one should probably focus more on the structural distinctions than on the actual struc-
tural configurations. The connection between [Spec,CP] and evaluability is in all likeli-
hood language specific, and evaluability may be mirrored differently in other languages,
much like the morpho-syntactic marking of such pragmatic concepts as topic/focus, po-
liteness and modality is different cross-linguistically. This is important, as arguing that
[Spec,CP] is inherently related to evaluability has rather far-reaching implications, and
furthermore blurs the distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. I will re-
turn to this issue in section 6 below.
Having established the notion of evaluability and consequently mapped different
sentence types to it, our next step is to relate evaluability to polarity sensitivity.
5 Evaluability as Polarity Sensitivity
In section 3, we observed an intricate correlation in Swedish between polarity sensitivity
and the structural configuration of the C-domain. In the previous section, I argued that
the Swedish C-domain mirrors the evaluative status of the clause. Consequently, it
seems reasonable to assume a connection between evaluability and polarity sensitivity
as well, as this may account for our initial observation.
By combining the evaluability classification, the configurations of the Swedish C-
domain and polarity sensitivity, we get the following schema:
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(16) Utterances
Evaluable [+[Spec,CP]]
Subjected
Licensing
Pattern 1
Not subjected
Licensing
 Pattern 2
Non-evaluable [–[Spec,CP]]
Licensing
Pattern 3
The Evaluability Classification and NPI-Licensing
As illustrated in (16), each licensing pattern is related to a distinct syntactic con-
figuration and is characteristic of a well-defined semantic class. Let us consider the
implications of these connections.
First, non-evaluable clauses host NPIs even in the absence of overt licensors, and
PPIs and NPIs are not in complementary distribution. Second, evaluable clauses only
allow formally licensed NPIs, and PPIs and NPIs are in complementary distribution.
Taken at face value, these differences make it difficult to draw one generalized conclu-
sion concerning the licensing and distribution of polarity items.
From the illustration in (16), the correct conclusion to draw seems to be that po-
larity items only sometimes are syntactically and/or semantically dependent, namely in
evaluable clauses. In non-evaluable clauses, their occurrence is free and hence do not
rely on syntactic licensing. But this may come across as a rather ineloquent conclusion,
as it is but a theoretically disguised description of the empirical observations. Further-
more, by opting for this interpretation, one must simultaneously abandon the ‘standard’
assumption that polarity items are necessarily dependent expressions. But perhaps this
is not a bad thing after all, considering the problems previous theories have had in ac-
counting for the non-complementary distribution of PPIs and NPIs (recall section 2).
The Evaluability Hypothesis presents an alternative approach that does account for the
evasive syntactic and semantic dependency behavior of polarity items.
Using a simple metaphor, we may equate polarity items in non-evaluable clauses
with fish in water: they occur in their right biosphere, as it were. Therefore, they need
not rely on any kind of formal (syntactic) licensing. The fact that NPIs and PPIs equally
occur in these environments falls out naturally. In contrast, polarity items in evaluable
clauses are like fish on land. In order to survive in their unnatural environment, the PI
must be rescued much like a fish out of water must be put within the confinement of a
water tank. This is where both syntactic scope and semantic truth-based inferencing in
the sense of Ladusaw comes in.
It should be emphasized that the distributional difference between strong and weak
NPIs is not problematic for the Evaluability Hypothesis. One of the keys to polarity
phenomena lies in acknowledging both the nature of the hosting environment and the
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nature of the hosted item. Some environments are inherently hostile to all kinds of po-
larity items, some are inherently accepting them. Simultaneously, some polarity items
are inherently choosy about their hosts (e.g. until-clauses), while others thrive in a large
number of contexts (e.g. any, någonsin ‘ever’). This fact does not in itself lessen the
explanatory adequacy of the Evaluability Hypothesis, since it applies to the hosting en-
vironment only. Thus, the observation that strong NPIs always require overt licensing
points not to a weakness of the theory, but to a semantic property of the lexical item.
Importantly, the current proposal constitutes a change of perspective from previous
theories. Ever since Klima (1964), work on polarity has been set on finding one, single
syntactic or semantic property relevant for licensing; preferably one that is associated
to negation. According to my proposal, however, the distribution of polarity items is
better thought of in terms of sensitivity. Furthermore, there is no immediate connection
to negation or negative expectations. Syntactic or semantic licensing can in light of the
present proposal be regarded as secondary: it is only required in those environments
which do not inherently fulfill the sensitivity requirements for polarity items. This idea
is explicated in the next subsection in relation to Ladusaw’s DE-hypothesis; in the fol-
lowing subsection, the current proposal is related Giannakidou’s notion of veridicality.
5.1 Evaluability and Monotonicity
As discussed in section 2, the main criticism against Ladusaw’s (1980) notion of down-
ward entailment was that it cannot be extended to yes/no-questions and conditionals.
But what if this ‘weakness’ is not really a weakness at all, but rather a natural con-
sequence of the fact that the notion is not applicable to (or of no relevance for) these
environments?
In light of the present proposal, one may argue that the DE-hypothesis is non-
applicable to a well-defined class of utterances. Intriguingly, the sentence types for
which the DE-hypothesis does not account correlate in a one-to-one fashion with our
non-evaluable category: the antecedent of conditionals, yes/no-questions, and om-com-
plements in general (e.g. the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals and embedded
yes/no-questions). Hence, one might argue that the DE-hypothesis fails to explain the
distribution of polarity items in non-evaluable clauses, simply because it only applies
to evaluable clauses. And the reason for this limitation is straightforward.
In order for a sentence to be evaluable, the speaker must take responsibility for the
truth of the expressed proposition (be it affirmative or negative); otherwise a sentence is
non-evaluable. Now, since only that which has a truth-value can be subjected to truth-
based inferencing, it follows that only evaluable clauses are monotone. Non-evaluable
clauses are necessarily non-monotone. The connection between evaluability and mono-
tonicity can thus be captured as in (17) below.
(17) i. Non-evaluable clauses cannot be challenged in discourse, since the speaker
does not take responsibility for its truth.
ii. For this reason, non-evaluable clauses do not allow truth-based inferencing:
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they are non-monotone.
iii. Consequently, the monotonicity principles are not applicable to non-evalu-
able clauses.
If this line of reasoning is on the right track, the fact that Ladusaw’s DE-hypothesis
cannot account for the occurrence of NPIs in yes/no-questions should not be taken as a
‘weakness’, as it is ultimately a consequence of the fact that yes/no-questions are non-
evaluable. That is, polarity items may occur freely in all non-evaluable environments
contexts precisely because they are non-monotone. Evaluable sentences, in contrast, are
either monotone increasing or decreasing, and, depending on which, only PPIs or NPIs
will be licensed. Hence, the DE-hypothesis may be subsumed under the Evaluability
Hypothesis, but its applicability is restricted to the evaluable class.
5.2 Evaluability and Veridicality
The most important difference between the concepts of evaluability and veridicality
concerns the view on negated sentences. According to the Veridicality Hypothesis, a
negative declarative asserts the falsity of p; hence a negative declarative pattern with
other nonveridical clauses which do not assert/presuppose the truth of p. According
to the Evaluability Hypothesis, a negative declarative asserts the truth of not-p, from
which it follows that both p and p are semantically distinct from sentences which
are not used to claim a truth-value, such as yes/no-questions and conditionals. These
opposing perspectives ultimately make the Evaluability Hypothesis and the Veridicality
Hypothesis incompatible with each other.
With regards to the distribution of NPIs, the Veridicality Hypothesis presents a rather
promising solution, as mentioned above. Under the assumption that (weak) NPIs are
sensitive to nonveridicality, it is expected to find them in both negative declaratives and
yes/no-questions. What is forgotten, it seems, is that PPIs also occur in yes/no-questions
and conditionals, but not in negative declaratives. Hence, one must conclude that PPIs
are insensitive to veridicality, as they are found in both veridical and nonveridical envi-
ronments. Put somewhat differently, one might perhaps say that PPIs are anti-licensed
by anti-veridicality: they may occur in any environment unless it is anti-veridical.
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2, the Veridicality Hypothesis incorrectly pre-
dicts complements to emotive factive predicates to disallow NPIs, as they are presup-
posed and therefore per definition veridical. Ultimately, this means that the distribution
of polarity items cuts right across the veridicality border. In fact, if we assume with
Giannakidou that polarity items are semantically dependent expressions that are sensi-
tive to the veridical status of the hosting clause, the distribution of PPIs in nonveridical
contexts and NPIs in veridical contexts all but falsifies this hypothesis.
In comparison, the Evaluability Hypothesis successfully explains both the non-
complementary distribution of PPIs and NPIs as well as occurrences of NPIs in veridi-
cal contexts. Rather than seeing polarity items as dependent on the absence of a truth-
entailment, I propose that they are sensitive to the evaluative status of the clause. Under
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this perspective, the truth of p is no longer primary; instead it is the act of claiming a
truth-value that is argued to be the decisive factor in accounting for the distribution
of polarity items. At least with regards to the Mainland Scandinavian languages, this
seems to be a more correct characterization than that of the Veridicality Hypothesis.
6 Syntactic arguments
In the previous sections I have defined the notion of evaluability and argued that it
can be successfully used to understand polarity sensitivity. A reasonable question to
ask at this point is what independent evidence there is for assuming that a notion like
evaluability is relevant for grammar. In this section, I suggest a syntactic account of
the connection between evaluability, polarity sensitivity and the configuration of the
Swedish C-domain.
Let us begin by discussing the position claimed to be relevant for evaluability, that
is, [Spec,CP]. So far, I have assumed without arguments that linear V1-clauses and
om-clauses lack [Spec,CP] altogether. A reader familiar with the ‘standard’ syntac-
tic account of Scandinavian Languages may find this analysis unorthodox. Under the
assumption that C hosts an uninterpretable EPP-feature, the presence of [Spec,CP] is
normally assumed also in V1-clauses. Under this view, linear V1- and V2-clauses only
differ with regards to the phonological realization of [Spec,CP]. Structurally, the finite
verb is always in second position, being preceded either by an overt clausal element or
a covert syntactic operator (see Holmberg and Platzack 2005).
In Brandtler (2012), I argue against this view in line with Platzack (2008, 2009),
who proposes abandoning the EPP-analysis of the Swedish C-domain in favor of an
edge-feature analysis. According to Chomsky (2008), the edge-feature in C can be
understood as a syntactic requirement that a phase head must have a specifier. Conse-
quently, the realization of [Spec,CP] is not motivated by the valuation of a particular
set of features (such as the EPP), and this affects the visibility condition of [Spec,CP]:
“EPP is a demand that an Agree-relation must be visible at the SM interface, the edge-
feature a demand that a phase head must have an A specifier. Hence, visibility at SM
holds for EPP but not necessarily for the edge-feature” Platzack (2008: 7). Following
the edge-feature analysis, the syntactic derivation of [Spec,CP] is thus dependent on
the presence of an edge-feature in C. Unless the edge-feature is instantiated, [Spec,CP]
cannot be realized.
The critical reader may object to the present characterization, arguing that the theo-
retical status of the notion edge-feature remains vague and therefore stipulative. While
I am the first to admit that the explanatory adequacy of the EF-analysis is debatable,
it is descriptively more accurate than the EPP-analysis. And the very fact that EF is
semantically or pragmatically void should not be seen as a weakness, however, since
we should not attribute meaning to a mechanism, but to its output.11
11One should keep in mind that the EPP may be criticized on similar grounds for being a rather abstract
concept with dubious explanatory power.
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Being in itself semantically vacuous, the edge-feature may instead be associated
to semantic content within a given language. And this, I would argue, is the reason
evaluability is reflected in the presence/ absence of [Spec,CP] in Swedish: it is a direct
consequence of the association between the pragmatic-semantic notion of evaluability
and the edge-feature in C. And this assumption, in turn, also accounts for the observed
correlation between polarity sensitivity and the configuration of the Swedish C-domain.
Assuming that [Spec,CP] is dependent on the instantiation of the Edge-Feature in C, the
connection between polarity sensitivity, evaluability and the structural configuration of
the C-domain can be summarized in the following way.
(18) i. Polarity items are sensitive to evaluability;
ii. Evaluability is associated to the edge-feature in C;
iii. The edge-feature in C is responsible for the syntactic derivation of [Spec,CP].
iv. Conclusion: The NPI-licensing properties of a Swedish clause correlate
with the structural realization of [Spec,CP].
If this hypothesis is correct, the observed correlation between [Spec,CP] and polarity
item licensing is language specific. It comes about as a result from the arbitrary asso-
ciation in Swedish between the edge-feature in C and evaluability. Hence, we cannot
draw any universal implications from this observation. However, the semantic con-
nection between evaluability and polarity sensitivity may be tested against any other
language. The strict modular approach as outlined here thus gives that the syntactic
association is language-specific, whereas the semantic connection may be universal (or
at least applicable to a large number of languages).
7 Summary
Let us now summarize the theoretical implications of the Evaluability Hypothesis, and
its relation to previous accounts of polarity item licensing.
The Evaluability Hypothesis suggests an alternative explanation to polarity sensi-
tivity as a phenomenon, which does not build on the opposition between affirmative and
negative sentences, or on the distinction between truth and falsity. Instead, it builds on
the possibility of an utterance being accepted as true or false within a communicative
exchange.
Evaluable utterances are truly polar, since they express either the truth of p or the
truth of p. It is irrelevant whether an evaluable clause is true or false in the absolute
sense of propositional or modal logic; it must only be possible to accept it as true in a
communicative exchange. In contrast, non-evaluable clauses are non-polar, since they
neither express the truth of p nor the truth ofp. For this reason, they cannot be accepted
or rejected in discourse.
Since non-evaluable clauses are non-polar, they are also non-monotone. This means
that both NPIs and PPIs may occur in identical syntactic and semantic environments.
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From this characterization, so called ‘non-negative licensing contexts’ (such as yes/no-
questions and conditionals) have nothing in common with ‘negative licensing contexts’
(such as negative declaratives) – in fact, they display quite opposing semantic prop-
erties. This conclusion is in stark contrast with former theories, which have sought to
unite negative and ‘non-negative’ licensing contexts. According to the Evaluability Hy-
pothesis, non-evaluable clauses are bona fide environments for polarity items, whereas
evaluable clauses are exceptional.
We have seen that the distinction between evaluable and non-evaluable clauses is
structurally mirrored in Swedish. Evaluable clauses are endowed with an edge-feature
in C, while non-evaluable clauses lack an edge-feature in C. At ‘surface structure’, this
difference is reflected by the presence or absence of [Spec,CP]. Hence, the Evaluabil-
ity Hypothesis straightforwardly accounts for the observed correlation between clause
structure and the distribution of polarity items in Swedish – the start of the entire study.
None of the previous theories of polarity sensitivity provides a viable account of this
observation.
Admittedly, the general applicability of the Evaluability Hypothesis remains to be
tested in other languages. However, I believe that the present study provides a promis-
ing alternative account of polarity phenomena, that both challenges and incorporates
previous theories put forward in the literature.
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